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1. Introduction 
ICARA represents national and international ATOD (Alcohol, tobacco and other drug) research 
associations and recognizes their diversity in purpose and function.  Furthermore, such associations 
operate in very different financial contexts, with a few having steady sources of income from 
membership fees, conferences or journals, and others relying on government support or voluntary 
donations.  Many will also be supported by sponsorship or funding from private organizations for 
conferences or other activities.   
Funding organizations, especially private enterprises, can have goals that conflict with the aims or 
purpose of the society as they exist primarily for profit, not public good.  Problems might therefore 
arise when sponsorship is provided by such organizations with vested interests.  A vested interest 
can be defined as “a strong reason for supporting a particular action which will give a personal or 
financial advantage”.  In the context of ATOD research, vested interests can be individuals or 
organizations interested in promoting a specific view on or opinion about research or public health 
issues in the ATOD field, for financial or other reasons.  Sponsorship also serves the purpose of 
enhancing the sponsor’s reputation and potential influence in ATOD policy or politics.   
These guidelines result from the documentation of the growing involvement of private enterprises, 
including the corporate alcohol industry, in ATOD research1.  It reflects the increasing concern about 
the involvement of such industries in activities that impinge upon the public health and social 
welfare missions of individual research scientists and, more broadly, of the mandate of research 
societies, associations and organizations.  
Traditional boundaries between scientists and for-profit industries have been diminishing in many 
countries as part of a general trend to make science more relevant to business applications and for 
nonprofit organizations to attract new sources of revenue 2.  This policy seeks to provide guidelines 
for research societies and for their academic and administrative staff with regard to engagement 
with industry organizations, as well as relationships with other funders.   
The guidelines provided here do not seek to instruct ICARA members on what funding sources are 
appropriate for member organizations.  If the profits of the sponsoring organization rely on the 
production or sale of addictive or potentially harmful commodities, ICARA urges members to 
exercise caution, and to make decisions based on careful consideration of potential risks and 
benefits both to the member organization and to the public good.   
2. Organizations with vested interests 
Several groups of organizations have vested interests in the ATOD field and the risks and benefits of 
interaction with and accepting support or sponsorship from each of these organizations will vary 
(see Table 1).  Financial conflicts of interest (whether direct or indirect) are generally considered to 
carry the highest risk, but other interests may become equally important if in conflict with the goals 
of an ATOD research association.   
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Table 1: Organization Types & Potential Vested Interests (not an exhaustive list) 
For profit: Not for profit: 
1. Businesses involved in the production of 
ATOD products for (non-medical) use: 
alcohol beverage producers; tobacco 
product manufacturers, marijuana 
product manufacturers.  These business 
generally have a vested interest in 
selling more of their products and 
avoiding policy measures which might 
reduce or restrict sales. (high) 
2. Businesses involved in the distribution 
or retail of ATOD products: 
supermarkets, wholesalers; shops; 
public houses, bars, hotels, restaurants, 
casinos, betting shops etc.  These 
business generally have a vested 
interest in selling more ATOD products 
from their premises (or type of 
premises) and avoiding policy measures 
that might reduce or restrict such sales. 
(high) 
3. Businesses involved in the production or 
sale of treatments or remedies for 
problems caused by ATOD use e.g. 
pharmaceutical companies; treatment 
providers etc. and which have a vested 
interest in promoting such treatments. 
(medium) 
4. Businesses involved in supporting the 
academic or research community e.g. 
publishers, research software or 
equipment providers etc. (lower) 
5. Social aspects or public relations organizations 
linked to or funded by the above businesses, but 
which may have publicly stated goals that differ 
from those of the business.  It may be hard to 
determine whether these organizations are 
funded by the industry or not, and they may be 
constituted as charities (risk same as funding 
source) 
6. Social enterprises, charities, NGOs or professional 
organizations which may or may not be linked to 
private industry funding, but which serve a specific 
function (e.g. providing in-patient treatment) and 
may have a vested interest in policy attention or 
funding being paid to a particular aspect of ATOD 
problems or treatment (e.g. advocating for in-
patient treatment) to ensure their own viability. 
(medium)   
7. Public or semi-public organizations involved in the 
production or sale of ATOD products e.g. state 
monopolies for the sale of alcohol, tobacco or 
state-owned gambling organizations.  Depending 
on their remit and regulatory regime, they may 
have vested interests in selling more or fewer 
products (variable, dependent on regulatory 
regime). 
8. Private individuals with personal or political 
motives for sponsorship.(medium) 
9. Public funders such as Government ministries, 
public health organizations or municipal 
authorities which usually have no direct economic 
interests but which may have specific political or 
professional interests (lower).   
 
Given the goals of ATOD industries is to maximize profits from the sale of their products, it is 
inevitable that the actions of such industries will at times be in conflict with the mission of scientific 
associations and the integrity of research scientists.  On the other hand, public bodies such as 
governmental agencies or ministries should have a goal of public benefit and operate in a 
transparent and accountable way, notwithstanding the fact that they may also be subject to or 
influenced by political direction or considerations.   
Decisions on accepting funding from such organizations should take careful account of the likelihood 
of contributing to public harm, through increased product sales, or industry influence on 
policymaking by doing so.  Secondly, such decisions should consider the risks to the organization 
itself, its reputation, or that of its members and ATOD science more generally of accepting funding 
that could lead to a perception or allegation of bias. 
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Further guidance is provided below to support decision-making.   
3. Risks and benefits from a societal perspective 
Alcohol, tobacco and other drugs are a major contributor to mortality and morbidity worldwide 3, 
through direct effects on consumers via non-communicable diseases and accidents, as well as 
broader effects ranging from the harms of second-hand smoke, to interpersonal violence, 
dependence and a variety of harms to children, families and relationships.  Alcohol and tobacco are 
produced and promoted by powerful and highly profitable multinational business complexes 4 which 
includes producers, distributors, trade associations, legal and public relations organizations, as well 
as social and public aspects organizations .   
The pharmaceutical industry is active in producing substances that are intended to alleviate suffering 
from diseases and other disorders. Some of these are highly addictive e.g. opioids and 
benzodiazepines. Researchers and others involved ICARA member organizations may have contact 
with the pharmaceutical industry as the producer of drugs to treat alcohol or drug dependence, or 
with individuals who are dependent on the drugs they produce.  Recent developments such as 
legalisation of the use of marijuana for medical and/or recreational purposes, and the granting of a 
medicines licence to a brand of electronic cigarette produced by a tobacco-industry-owned company 
are examples of processes that blur the distinction between medicines and drugs of abuse, and the 
varying industries that produce them.   
The activities of the tobacco industry succeeded in avoiding, delaying or minimizing regulation that 
could have prevented millions of people from smoking and ultimately suffering or dying from 
tobacco-related illnesses.  Several systematic reviews have documented the tactics used by the 
tobacco industry to avoid regulation, and these include attempts to ‘shape’ the evidence base 
through the funding of scientists, the creation of alliances with other organizations, and the 
commissioning of technical reports 5.  Alcohol industry tactics have included selective citation of 
industry-favorable evidence, omission of evidence, and contesting the nature of evidence.  These 
tactics are used distract, distort and/or discredit scientific evidence to avoid regulation that might 
adversely affect industry profits 6–8.   
The pharmaceutical industry has been criticised for failings in published clinical trials, a failure to 
publish negative clinical trials, contributing to overdiagnosis through medicalisation and disease-
mongering, and overprescribing 9–11.  The activities of the industry are facilitated in part though the 
funding of ‘key opinion leaders’ to conduct trials and write papers with funding from the company 12.  
Multiple reviews have found that studies funded by the industry are more likely to yield results 
favourable to the industry, than when funding comes from other sources 13–15.  Furthermore, 
pharmaceutical companies have been fined for mis-selling and off-label promotion and for criminal 
activity including bribery 16,17. 
Where organizations have an unfavorable reputation, they may gain respectability by associating 
themselves with scientists and reputable ATOD research associations.  Even if funding or support is 
unrestricted, there may be indirect consequences if the funder uses their involvement to rehabilitate 
their reputation, enhance their credibility as a funder of science, or gain influence with policymakers.  
This may result in public policies that are less effective in reducing ATOD-related harm. 
4. Risks and benefits from the perspective of the ATOD association 
The potential benefits of sponsorship or funding for ATOD associations may seem clear, in that 
resources are provided to support the activities or aims of the association.  Where there is an 
alignment between the aims of the sponsor and those of the association, sponsorship arrangements 
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may provide mutual benefit.  Even in such cases however, the relationship should be managed 
carefully and transparently (see Section 5 below), and it should not be assumed that the goals of 
sponsoring organizations are those that are publicly stated.   
In all cases of sponsorship or funding by vested interests, and in particular those of private 
enterprises, there is at least the risk that ATOD associations (a) be seen as endorsing the sponsor, its 
positions, activities or industry more broadly, (b) lose their credibility as independent and unbiased 
sources of scientific evidence and public health advice; or (c) become influenced in a certain 
direction.   
(a) Perceived Endorsement: Firstly, the acceptance of sponsorship carries a risk of potentially being 
seen to be endorsing the sponsoring organization, its products, policies and activities; or the 
industry of which it is part (e.g. the alcohol industry).  In accepting the funding arising from the 
profits of an industry whose products are known to be harmful, the association or researcher 
may be seen as profiting from public harm.  The sponsoring organisation gains in respectabliity 
by virtue of providing the sponsorship (as discussed above).Furthermore, the association may 
inadvertently lend credibility to the industry positions on policy, that are often inconsistent with 
published peer-reviewed evidence. 
(b) Reputational Damage: Secondly, researchers and research organizations that accept funding 
from industry sources, risk being perceived as biased in their activities and jeopardise their 
credibility and reputation as independent scientific associations.  This may have implications for 
their role in future policy debates.  Individuals involved with the association may similarly find 
that the acceptance of funding may lead to reputational damage and preclude involvement in 
certain committees (e.g. WHO). 
(c) Bias or Conflicts of Interest: Thirdly, sponsorship, funding or other relationships with vested 
interests organisations may lead to actual conflicts of interest and biases (conscious or 
unconscious) that affect the integrity and/or direction of ATOD science.  Sponsors may be 
selective in the programs they fund, supporting only projects that are consistent with their view 
of how ATOD problems should be addressed.  These are projects where likely findings will not 
impinge on sales or profits.  Where resources are not plentiful, sponsorship can shift the balance 
of focus within an organization onto funded activities relating to the sponsor’s interests, leaving 
less time for the officers or volunteers of the association, or those organizing conferences to 
focus on other issues.  This therefore biases the focus towards the preferred interventions and 
worldview of the sponsor.  Finally, there is evidence that even unrestricted financial support may 
lead to individuals unconsciously adjusting their decision-making towards the funder’s position. 
Whilst considered lower risk, associations should also be mindful that not-for-profit organizations, 
including governmental agencies, may also influence the activities of ATOD researchers and 
organizations.  Where such funding is unrestricted, it is considered low risk, however some funding 
contracts have been found to have secrecy clauses and several researchers have reported 
interference in their research from government agencies18.  The guidelines in Section 5 should help 
to manage relationships with all funders and sponsors, not just private enterprises. 
5. Managing relationships with vested interests organizations 
Bearing in mind the varied and substantial nature of potential risks involved, ICARA recommends 
that its member organizations adhere to three primary principles in making decisions on 
relationships with funders and organizations with vested interests.   
(a) Due Diligence: The association should seek to fully understand the risks of the proposed 
arrangement by establishing clear information on the proposed sponsor or funder, their aim, 
function and political activities, the original source of funding, and proposed conditions 
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(informal or contractual) governing the arrangement.  Consideration should be given not 
only to the individual organization offering support, but the broader grouping or industry of 
which they may be part. 
(b) Open Decision-Making: The association should promote a thorough and open discussion on 
the ethical and practical implications related to this type of funding at the level of the board 
of the association and amongst members and develop general guiding principles and 
procedures.  This should consider the advantages and disadvantages of funding from various 
sources, the degree of influence by the sponsoring organization which is acceptable to 
members; and the risks to the association’s credibility and focus as outlined above.  The 
agreed policy/principles should then guide future decision making. 
(c) Transparency in All Relationships: Agreed policies and procedures, and all types of funding 
or other arrangements with external organizations, and any related conditions and 
limitations, should be declared in a transparent manner to the society members and to the 
general public.  
Further advice on implementing these three principles is provided below. 
(a) Due Diligence 
When considering whether or not to develop a relationship with, or accept support or funding from 
any organization, ICARA members are encouraged to find out as much as possible about the 
organization.   
i. Where does the offered funding come from?  Follow the funding trail to identify the original 
source of funding or in-kind support for the organizations activities.   
ii. Has the funding been made available through compulsory taxation or a levy, or through 
voluntary contributions on ATOD businesses?  If so, what is the involvement of the ATOD 
industry in decisions about funding allocation?  
iii. What are the aims of the organization offering support?  What are the aims of the original 
funding provider (the funding source)?  Are these aims similar to or in conflict with the aims 
of the research organization? 
iv. Consider the reputation and activities of the sponsoring body, and whether there is a risk in 
being associated with that organization - see examples above regarding the alcohol and 
tobacco industry.  A risk assessment such as that of the World Obesity Federation may be 
necessary for some organizations 
v. What management or contractual arrangements (formal or informal) are proposed and how 
is the integrity and independence of the organization to be assured?  Is the funding 
restricted or unrestricted?  Are there any restrictions on communication?  Any type of 
limitation of the freedom of a society to execute or communicate its work independently 
should be discussed carefully.  
vi. How will the funding be acknowledged in a way that ensures transparency but avoids 
promoting the sponsor’s products (logos or branding) or preferred policy positions where 
they are not aligned with those of the ATOD Association?   
vii. How will the funder be permitted to describe the arrangements to others?   
viii. How well do the proposed activities to be funded align with WHO priorities and best buys for 
relevant policy?  Is there evidence to support the likelihood of the supported activities 
leading to reduced harm from ATOD? 
ix. What proportion of the society’s income will be derived from the sponsoring arrangement?  
Associations should monitor this to avoid becoming overly dependent on any funder(s).   
 
(b) Open Discussion & Policy Development 
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i. The information established during the Due Diligence process should be made fully available 
to members and the governing bodies of the ATOD association. 
ii. The board or officers of the Association should consult openly with members about the risks, 
benefits and ethics of accepting support or funding from organizations with vested interests, 
taking into consideration the points made in this guidance above. 
iii. Each association should develop a written, publicly accessible policy on accepting funds 
from organizations with vested interests, and this policy should be available for society 
members and the public.  Organizations may wish to develop different procedures for 
specific industries or organization types, for different amounts of funding, or for different 
types of collaboration.  The World Obesity Federation policy provides an example of this 
kind of ‘triage’ system for decision-making (see http://www.worldobesity.org/who-we-
are/what-we-stand-for/financial-engagement-policy/) . 
iv. Associations should have a process in place for the management and declaration of conflicts 
of interest for members, attendees, and presenters at Association events.  
v. Associations should develop policy on the management of conflicts of interest in the 
governance of the organization (board members, working group chairs, active 
representatives of the Association).  One example of this would be that board members with 
declared interests relating to an industry or company should not participate in decision-
making about the involvement of that industry or company in Association business. Another 
is that the ICARA member INEBRIA does not permit members with any alcohol industry 
funding in the previous 5 years from sitting on its co-ordinating committee 
http://inebria.net/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/position_statement_on_the_alcohol_indust
ry.pdf .   
vi. Associations may wish to consider establishing an independent ethical advisory committee 
to advise the Board on policy and decision-making in relation to these matters or to 
adjudicate on individual cases where necessary.  Members of this committee should be 
independent of the governance of the Association, or non-members if possible, and 
themselves without conflicts of interest.  
 
(c) Transparency 
i. The policies and procedures agreed above should be made publicly available and all 
members should be made aware of them. 
ii. Any arrangements for funding, sponsorship or in-kind support from organizations with 
vested interests must be transparently and publicly declared.  No agreements should be 
entered into that prevent or impede this transparency.  Associations may also wish to make 
public any decisions to decline to enter into such arrangements and the reasons for the 
decision.   
iii. Where a funder has any input into outputs from funded activity, such input should be openly 
declared.  
iv. An annual report of sponsored activities should be made available to members and 
published.   
v. Members should have access to the declarations of interest of Board members, officers or 
representatives of the Association 
vi. COI statements for conference presentations or any inputs to meetings or events should be 
easily accessible to those attending the event e.g. accompanying abstracts. 
vii. For all sponsored activities and all sponsoring organizations, a written agreement should be 
available fulfilling the following criteria: 
− Name of the sponsor including possible background of sponsoring 
organizations 
− Description of the sponsored activity and aims 
− Budget and financial share for the activity 
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− Rights and restrictions agreed for the ATOD Association as well as for the funding 
organization including in relation to public relations 
− Regulations for premature termination of the arrangements or funding 
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